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Abstract 
 
For the last several decades, governments around the world have tried to 
use so-called voluntary programs to motivate private firms to act proactively to 
protect the environment.  Unlike conventional environmental regulation, voluntary 
programs offer businesses flexibility to adopt cost-effective measures to reduce 
environmental impacts. Rather than prodding firms to act through threats of 
enforcement, they aim to entice firms to move forward by offering various kinds of 
positive incentives, ranging from public recognition to limited forms of regulatory 
relief. Despite the theoretical appeal of voluntary programs, their proper role in 
government’s environmental toolkit depends on the empirical evidence of how 
these programs work in practice. This paper offers a comprehensive empirical 
overview of voluntary programs’ design and impact. It shows that not all voluntary 
programs are the same. Rates of business participation in voluntary programs 
depend on a variety of factors, including both how these programs are designed as 
well as, importantly, what kinds of relevant background regulatory threats may 
loom for business. Although governments and policy advocates sometimes urge 
voluntary programs as a substitute for conventional government regulation, it 
appears that the most effective voluntary programs depend on a robust backdrop of 
community pressure and regulatory threats. Studies that find these programs yield 
statistically discernible effects on firm behavior generally find only substantively 
small impacts, suggesting that at best voluntary programs can serve as a modest 
supplement to government regulation. 
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Motivating without Mandates: 
The Role of Voluntary Programs in Environmental Governance 
 
 
Cary Coglianese* and Jennifer Nash** 
 
 
Is it possible for governments to foster better environmental performance 
simply by encouraging firms to take steps to do so, without ever requiring them to 
do so? Since the mid-1980s, governments around the world have been attracted to 
the potential for voluntary environmental programs to coax private sector firms to 
reduce pollution and save natural resources. These programs attempt to change 
private sector behavior not by requiring compliance with mandatory regulations, 
but by offering often modest incentives, such as access to information and positive 
public recognition. They might even be said to try to nudge business managers 
toward socially desired behavior without imposing a heavy hand of governmental 
control.1  
Voluntary programs hold great appeal. State and federal governments in the 
United States operate perhaps as many as 200 voluntary environmental programs, 
and upwards of 300 exist throughout the European Union.2 In the United States, the 
federal Environmental Protection Agency (US EPA) has created a veritable 
smorgasbord of such programs, ranging from voluntary product labeling systems, 
such as its well-known Energy Star program that promotes energy-efficient product 
design,3 to public recognition programs, such as US EPA’s highly-trumpeted 
“33/50” program that in the 1990s gave public recognition to companies that made 
commitments to reduce releases of toxic chemicals.4 For many years, the US EPA’s 
flagship voluntary program was its National Environmental Performance Track that 
offered public recognition and modest regulatory relief to facilities that made 
several “beyond-compliance” environmental commitments.5  
The theoretical appeal of governmental voluntary environmental programs 
is seductive. We begin this chapter, therefore, by summarizing the theoretical 
advantages of voluntary programs, but we also consider some of their potential 
limitations. After showing how the design of these programs can vary greatly, we 
review what researchers know about how effective these programs can be in 
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** Director, Business and Environment Initiative, Harvard Business School. 
A revised version of this working paper is forthcoming in Lee Paddock and Robert 
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1 Thaler and Sunstein (2008) 
2 Darnall and Carmin (2005) 76; Delmas and Keller (2005) 91. Governments in developing 
countries increasingly operate voluntary programs as well. Blackman (2010). 
3 US EPA (2015). 
4 Coglianese and Nash (2014) 70-80. 
5 Ibid. 
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reducing environmental degradation and risks. Voluntary programs’ effectiveness 
depends primarily on two factors: the number of firms that will participate in them 
and the average effect for each participant.6 In addressing the first of these, we 
consider what we know about why firms decide to join voluntary programs: 
principally, to stave off the costs of regulatory compliance, appeal to customers and 
other external interests, and fulfill managers’ own values. These motivations, we 
show, have proven insufficient to persuade any large fraction of polluting firms to 
join voluntary programs, let alone invest in major, costly environmental 
improvements. As a result, the impacts of voluntary programs are mixed, with at 
best some evidence of small, positive results from a few programs. Surprisingly, 
given voluntary programs’ seductive appeal of motivating firms without costly 
mandates, their performance in practice is such that their role can amount to little 
more than a minor supplement to mandatory regulations. Research to date indicates 
that voluntary programs work best when government possesses the capacity, and 
expends the resources needed, to verify members’ claims of voluntary 
accomplishments—and ultimately when mandatory regulation looms in the 
background as a viable threat. 
 
Theoretical advantages and disadvantages 
 
The idea of motivating without mandates holds considerable appeal because 
environmental regulation and its enforcement are costly—not just for industry, but 
also for government. The US EPA’s budget included more than $790 million for 
compliance and enforcement activities in FY 2015, approximately 10 percent of its 
budget overall.7 The costs of complying with environmental regulations—borne by 
private sector firms as well as governments at the local, state, and federal levels—
has been estimated at $200 billion annually in the United States alone.8 Since 
regulations can sometimes be over-inclusive—one size hardly always fits all—
alternative approaches to environmental governance promise significant cost 
savings. After all, voluntary programs are voluntary. Firms can choose their own 
means of environmental control, seeking the lowest cost strategies to improve the 
environment.  
Voluntary programs also purportedly cost less for government agencies to 
implement, as firms can be required to come forward to provide documentation of 
their voluntary accomplishments. Especially during periods of political gridlock 
and fiscal austerity, these programs constitute an attractive option for addressing 
perceived gaps in the existing regulatory system, whether to address the problems 
of climate change, toxic contamination, natural resource shortages, or species 
extinction.  
Voluntary programs also promise to reduce the level of conflict between 
business and government that seems to pervade most regulatory fields today, 
                                                     
6 Borck and Coglianese (2009). 
7 US EPA (2014) 9. 
8 Fiorino (2006) 1. Fiorino bases this estimate on US EPA (1990). It represents annual 
costs in the United States in 2000. 
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fostering an ethic of shared responsibility for protecting the environment.9 Because 
voluntary programs merely suggest, rather than dictate, activities that firms can take 
to protect the environment, they have won widespread support from both 
governments and industries, with support often cutting across political ideologies. 
Governments can also often create voluntary programs through administrative 
action, foregoing the lengthy and contentious process of legislative review and 
approval.10  
In addition, some proclaim that voluntary programs can encourage private-
sector managers to think critically about ways to improve their environmental 
performance, prompting discovery of environmental protection activities that are 
in their self-interest.11 They are opportunities, in other words, for the promotion of 
win-win solutions to environmental sustainability. They can leverage the deep, 
firsthand knowledge that private-sector managers have about where the greatest or 
most cost-effective opportunities for environmental improvement lie.12 Many 
programs also create opportunities for information sharing among firms, as well as 
with government, thereby facilitating the diffusion of best environmental 
practices.13  
These theoretical benefits of voluntary programs are clearly significant. Of 
course, they are also counter-balanced with some potential limitations and 
disadvantages too. Even if voluntary programs are relatively less costly for 
government to administer, if conventional regulatory programs are in fact more 
effective, then any investments in voluntary programs might be ill-advised. After 
all, the governmental costs of voluntary programs are not trivial. In 2006, for 
example, US EPA spent approximately $352 million on program advertising and 
recruitment, application processing, grants, and overall administration of its 
voluntary programs.14   
Some worry that voluntary programs not only divert fiscal resources but 
also dampen the political case for more effective policies. They could create an 
impression that important problems are being addressed in a win-win fashion, thus 
taking the pressure off politicians to make tough regulatory decisions. At a more 
operational level, voluntary programs might also misallocate inspection resources 
as they demand that government officials give more of their time and attention to 
responsible firms instead of targeting for scrutiny those firms that pose the greatest 
health and environmental risks.15 Worse yet, if they are not carefully designed and 
administered, voluntary programs might also perversely recognize and reward the 
wrong firms, putting government in a role of supporting industry “greenwashing.”16  
                                                     
9 Fiorino (2006) 20-21, discussing the benefits of a new type of environmental regulation 
exemplified by the US EPA’s National Environmental Performance Track. 
10 Coglianese and Nash (2014) 10. 
11 Fiorino (1999) 449; Orts (1995); Esty and Winston (2006). 
12 Coglianese and Nash (2001) 10. 
13 Coglianese and Nash (2014) 85. 
14 US EPA Office of Inspector General (2006) 5.  
15 Nash (2005) 270. 
16 Delmas and Keller (2005). 
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Variability among programs 
 
These theoretical benefits and limitations of voluntary programs point to the 
need for empirical research on what these programs accomplish in practice. Any 
such research must first begin with understanding how these programs are 
designed. It is true, of course, that all voluntary programs share a common purpose: 
to encourage firms and other entities to improve their environmental performance 
through incentives rather than regulatory threats. But they also differ widely in the 
way they are designed and the types of incentives they offer. 
Voluntary programs can be grouped into three main types: public voluntary 
programs (where governments define program requirements and invite firms to 
join), negotiated agreements (where firms and governments jointly define 
environmental requirements through negotiation), and unilateral agreements 
(where trade associations or firms themselves define requirements for their 
environmental activities, without any direct input from government).17 Public 
voluntary programs and negotiated agreements are the primary focus of this 
chapter, as we are concerned with understanding better the role of voluntary 
programs in government’s environmental policy portfolio. 
Governments often create voluntary programs to address environmental 
problems not yet covered by regulation. Some of the first voluntary programs, for 
example, targeted unregulated uses and releases of toxic chemicals from 
manufacturing firms.18 And today, many programs encourage reductions in 
greenhouse gases that have escaped regulatory control.19 Some programs encourage 
facilities to improve overall environmental performance by adopting environmental 
management systems, which are not currently required in most jurisdictions.20 
Other programs, such as Energy Star in the United States, focus on adoption of 
energy saving technologies.   
Governments offer a range of incentives to encourage firms to join 
voluntary programs. The most common incentive is access to information, whether 
through opportunities for peer-to-peer sharing, meetings with high-ranking 
                                                     
17 Segerson and Li (2000) 275. 
18 US EPA launched 33/50 in 1990 to encourage firms voluntarily to reduce releases of 
17 designated chemicals by 33 percent by 1992 and by 50 percent by 1995, relative to 
1988 levels. The Canadian Environmental Agency created a similar program, Accelerated 
Reduction/Elimination of Toxics, in the early 1990s. Chittock and Hughey (2011) 544-
545; Antweiler and Harrison (2007).  
19 US EPA currently operates more than 25 voluntary programs encouraging industry and 
the public sector to reduce energy consumption and emissions of greenhouse gases: 
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/EPAactivities/voluntaryprograms.html. British and 
Danish voluntary programs to reduce greenhouse gases are described, respectively, in 
Glachant and de Muizon (2007) and Krarup and Millock (2007). 
20 The European Union Eco-Management and Audit Scheme is a prominent example. See 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/emas/index_en.htm. 
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officials, or technical assistance to members.21 Some programs offer grants to 
encourage new environmental management techniques. Some European 
governments provide tax rebates to firms that voluntarily agree to improve their 
energy efficiency.22  
For many programs, the primary incentive is governmental recognition that 
the business is an environmental ‘leader’.23 Leadership recognition sometimes 
takes place through affirmative publicity that hails specific businesses on agency 
websites and press releases. It also comes about by authorizing marketing logos and 
product labeling. Increasingly, governments use public voluntary programs to 
encourage manufacturers to improve the environmental performance of their 
products—the incentive for programs of this type is usually a product label.24  
Some voluntary programs also offer regulatory benefits such as reduced 
regulatory oversight or exemption from certain reporting or other administrative 
requirements.25 The US National Environmental Performance Track program, for 
example, applied more relaxed standards under hazardous waste laws to qualifying 
facilities and also promised these facilities a reduction in enforcement scrutiny.26 
Voluntary programs vary widely with respect to other aspects of their 
design. Some programs set more ambitious requirements for entry and ongoing 
participation than others. Some monitor participants’ adherence to program 
commitments more closely than others, sometimes through third-party auditing. 
Others require that members disclose information about their performance or 
impose sanctions, including removal from the program, on those who fall behind. 
Of course, a number of programs have only ‘weak’ entry requirements and soft 
oversight.27 
The variations in design elements make it difficult to generalize about all 
voluntary programs. The way they are designed can be expected to make some 
more effective than others. But what exactly does it mean for a voluntary program 
to be effective? Effectiveness is generally understood to be a function of two 
principal factors: the number of firms that choose to participate, and the average 
effect for each participant, as shown in Figure 1.28 Unless the average effect is 
profound, the ability of these programs to attract members will be a critical variable. 
If voluntary programs are little known or do not induce many firms to change their 
                                                     
21 Lyon and Maxwell (2007) 727.  
22 Krapaup and Millock (2007) 86. 
23 Lyon and Maxwell (2007) 727; Coglianese and Nash (2014) 28. 
24 US EPA Office of Inspector General (2006) 4. 
25 Coglianese and Nash (2014) 29. 
26 Ibid 30. 
27 Prakash and Potoski (2006) 54-62. 
28 Coglianese and Nash (2014). Borck and Coglianese (2009) note the theoretical 
possibility that voluntary programs may also have spillover effects, shaping the 
environmental practices of firms that do not participate as members. However, since 
these are at best weak, subsidiary effects (Coglianese and Nash (2014) 84 n 529), we 
focus here on the primary effects, which also have been the most widely studied. 
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behavior to qualify for entry into the program, then these programs will at best only 
have marginal overall effects on the environment. 
 
Figure 1. Factors determining the effectiveness of voluntary programs 
 
 
Source: Borck and Coglianese (2009) 310. 
 
Drawing on studies from the United States, Europe, and developing countries, the 
remainder of this chapter reports what researchers have learned about these two 
factors—both why some firms choose to participate, and how participation affects 
their environmental performance. 
 
Why firms join 
 
Policymakers seeking to design voluntary programs that will have a 
significant impact need to understand what makes membership appealing to 
businesses. Researchers have used multiple approaches to explore firms’ 
motivations: theoretical modeling, econometric analysis, and qualitative research. 
One reason firms participate in voluntary programs is to stave off or reduce 
the cost of regulatory compliance. Segerson and Miceli developed modeling that 
shows how a firm’s voluntary actions will increase as the threat of regulation 
grows.29 Compared to mandatory regulation, a voluntary program lowers both 
environmental protection costs for the firm and transaction costs for the regulator, 
although the level of environmental protection achieved may also be lower.30 Self-
interested firms may use voluntary programs to deter consumer groups from 
organizing for mandatory controls.31 By voluntarily committing to a high level of 
environmental performance, firms may convince regulators to defer the 
establishment of mandatory controls.32 
Empirical evidence generally supports these predictions. Firms that join 
voluntary programs tend to be larger, have higher levels of toxic releases, and be 
subject to higher levels of regulation than non-participants.33 These are precisely 
the kinds of firms whose compliance regulators are most likely to scrutinize 
closely—and who might particularly value the regulatory benefits that voluntary 
programs provide. These regulatory benefits have included substantive exemptions 
as well as reduced inspection scrutiny.  For example, US EPA granted regulatory 
relief to firms that joined Project XL, a program in which the agency negotiated 
agreements with individual firms under which the agency granted regulatory 
                                                     
29 Segerson and Miceli (1998) 128.  
30 Ibid 129. 
31 Maxwell, Lyon, and Hackett (2000) 613. 
32 Lutz and others (2000) 346. 
33 Arora and Cason (1995) 430; Videras and Alberini (2000) 460; Khanna and Damon 
(1999) 16-17. 
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exemptions in exchange for the firms providing a demonstrated ability to achieve 
superior environmental performance through other means.34 As already noted, one 
of the benefits the US EPA offered members of its National Environmental 
Performance Track program was designation as a low priority for routine federal 
and state compliance inspections.35 Researchers have found that governments 
inspect members of other voluntary programs less closely than non-members.36 
Firms that joined the U.S. EPA’s 33/50 program, for example, experienced fewer 
inspections and enforcement actions, even though the program did not explicitly 
offer that benefit.37  
In addition to gaining potential advantages in the ways governments 
regulate, firms also join voluntary programs to appeal to customers and community 
and environmental interest groups. Firms can benefit from sharing their positive 
environmental achievements with consumers, customers, and investors, and 
voluntary programs offer a way of boosting the credibility of their claims.38 In this 
way, participation in voluntary programs helps firms reinforce a reputation for 
environmental awareness and concern.39 Empirical research finds that participating 
firms are indeed the ones more likely to spend more on advertising and that more 
highly value customer goodwill, consistent with the expectation that these firms 
view participation as a way to bolster their public image.40 Managers who recognize 
stakeholder influences as important to their organizations report being more 
interested in joining voluntary programs.41  
A firm’s decision to join a voluntary program is also shaped by the 
characteristics of the firm and its managers—in particular, the values and identities 
of those responsible for determining whether to join a voluntary program. A firm’s 
management style—its “expressed attitudes” about environmental problems, 
relevant actions, and explanations of its environmental decisions—influence the 
way managers interpret and act on regulatory requirements and demands from 
external interests.42 Internal characteristics serve as a lens through which managers 
make sense of what’s going on inside and outside their organizations. For some, 
joining a voluntary program reinforces preexisting environmental leadership roles 
and attitudes. For others, these programs have little relevance and are viewed as 
“paperwork” that amounts to little more than “fluff.”43 A study of participants and 
non-participants in the US EPA’s Performance Track found that participants were 
distinguished by the level of internal management support for voluntary program 
membership, the degree to which their organizations’ identity was linked to 
                                                     
34 Boyd and others (1998) 5. 
35 Coglianese and Nash (2014) 29. 
36 Innes and Sam (2008) 290-291. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Arora and Gangopadhyay (1995); Darnall and Carmin (2005). 
39 Segerson and Li (1999); Lyon and Maxwell (2002). 
40 Arora and Cason (1996); Khanna and Damon (1999). 
41 Darnall and others (2009). 
42 Gunningham and others (2003) 97. 
43 Howard-Grenville and others (2006) 96. 
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environmental excellence, and the value managers placed on displays of behavior 
intended for those outside their organizations.44  
Finally, a firm’s decision to join a voluntary program is affected by certain 
features of the program itself, such as the stringency of its entry criteria and the 
types of benefits it offers. Researchers have noted a “participation paradox” in 
which programs that offer the greatest benefits tend to attract the fewest members. 
This paradox is the result of governments’ tendency to set demanding admissions 
requirements for programs that offer significant rewards—so demanding that few 
firms appear interested to meet them.45 In a 1996 review of US EPA voluntary 
programs, Davies and Mazurek attributed high participation rates in the agency’s 
33/50 program to the ease with which firms were able to join, and they noted that 
efforts to continue the program were unsuccessful when the agency sought to 
impose additional eligibility criteria on firms.46  
Most research on why businesses participate in voluntary programs has 
focused on decisions about “partnership” voluntary programs, ones in which 
governments specify entry requirements for firms to “join” a select group of 
recognized businesses. Firms can be expected to participate in other kinds of 
voluntary programs for similar reasons, although “product certification” voluntary 
programs offer companies one additional incentive: potential market advantage if 
consumers value the label available for qualifying products.   
Although the US EPA’s most well-known product certification program, 
Energy Star, boasts upwards of 16,000 participating businesses across 70 different 
product categories, most other voluntary programs attract only a small percentage 
of eligible firms. Only about 4,100 organizations participate in the European 
Union’s Eco-Management and Audit Scheme, a voluntary program open to any 
organization worldwide.47 At its peak in 2008, the US EPA’s Performance Track 
program attracted about 575 members, out of a potential membership pool of 
hundreds of thousands of facilities.48 In 2006, the combined membership of US 
EPA’s 11 programs geared to reducing greenhouse gases amounted to about 2,900 
businesses.49 Although several thousand participating companies may seem like a 
lot, this is actually a tiny fraction of the millions of businesses that operate—and 
affect the environment—in a country the size of the United States. 
 
How participation impacts environmental performance 
 
Assessing the impact of voluntary programs on environmental performance 
presents several methodological challenges. The factors that lead firms to join 
voluntary programs—sensitivity to regulatory, competitive, and social drivers, as 
well as distinct internal characteristics—also shape their behavior once they 
                                                     
44 Coglianese and Nash (2014) 70. 
45 Coglianese and Nash (2014) 80. 
46 Davies and Mazurek (1996) 68. 
47 Milieu Ltd and Risk and Policy Analysis Ltd (2009) iv. 
48 Hassell and others (2010) 24. 
49 US EPA Office of Inspector General (2008a) 3. 
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become members. Separating the factors that caused them to join from the influence 
of the voluntary program itself is difficult.50 Only rarely do governments establish 
a baseline of performance before the program begins. While some programs collect 
information on participants’ environmental performance over time—tracking 
changes in their releases of greenhouse gases, for example—comparable 
information is rarely available for non-participants.51 Nevertheless, some 
researchers have begun to tackle the evaluation challenges using statistical analyses 
of how participation affects behavior and certain measures of environmental 
outcomes.  
 
Experience in developed countries 
 
The overall account of voluntary programs’ impacts on environmental 
performance is modest and mixed. One of US EPA’s earliest voluntary programs, 
the 33/50 program, has been the subject of numerous empirical studies.  Khanna 
and Damon found that participation in US EPA’s 33/50 program resulted in 
reductions in toxic releases of about 28 percent during the program’s first three 
years.52 Innes and Sam assessed the program over multiple years and also found 
that the program reduced emissions, but primarily during 1991 and 1992.53 Vidovic 
and Khanna, however, found that firms made most of the reductions attributed to 
the program in the years prior to its inception, suggesting that members joined in 
order to claim credit for actions already taken.54 Undertaking a more detailed 
analysis, Gamper-Rabindran concluded that the program’s impact varied by 
industry. In the chemical industry, for example, the beneficial impacts noted in 
previous studies disappeared when two ozone-depleting chemicals were removed 
from the analysis—as firms were required to phase out these chemicals under 
binding rules called for in the Montreal Protocol.55  
Voluntary programs appear to work best under threat of looming mandatory 
regulation. Prior to launching the 33/50 program, US EPA had announced plans to 
regulate most of the chemicals included in this program under the federal Clean Air 
Act’s Maximum Available Control Technology (MACT) standards. By joining this 
program, firms were able to reduce emissions of these chemicals in their own way, 
at their own pace, while receiving recognition and technical assistance from US 
EPA. Firms in states with strong environmental group membership had greater 
reductions of 33/50 chemicals, perhaps because the threat of mandatory regulation 
was higher in those states.56  
                                                     
50 Borck and Coglianese (2009) 310-312. 
51 Ibid; see also Morgenstern and Pizer (2007) 179-181. 
52 Khanna and Damon (1999).  US EPA ended the program in 1996, declaring that 
emissions of the program’s 17 targeted chemicals had declined by 50 percent. Johnson 
(1996); US EPA (1999). 
53 Innes and Sam (2008) 292. 
54 Vidovic and Khanna (2007) 192. 
55 Gamper-Rabindran (2006). 
56 Maxwell and others (2000). 
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Improvements that can be attributed solely to voluntary programs tend to be 
small—nearly indistinguishable in most cases from what might well have happened 
anyway in the absence of these programs. Most of the gains attributed to US EPA’s 
Strategic Goals Program were achieved prior to the program’s start date; only water 
discharges fell continuously throughout the life of the program.57 The effect of US 
EPA’s Climate Wise program on participant behavior appears to have been 
temporary—just for at most one to two years.58 In both cases, the incentives US 
EPA offered for joining these programs appear to have been insufficient to affect 
participants’ behavior. (When surveyed, participants in US EPA’s Performance 
Track program considered the rewards of that program to be quite small.59) Studies 
of the US Climate Challenge found no difference between emissions reductions of 
participants and non-participants, although some evidence suggests that late joiners 
were free-riding on the contributions of those who joined early.60 A study of 
implementation of voluntary programs in OECD countries concluded that, in most 
cases, factors other than the voluntary program were likely responsible for any 
observed improvements in environmental performance.61  
In some cases, faulty implementation by governmental agencies have been 
said to have undermined programs’ effectiveness. In assessing US EPA’s Project 
XL, Marcus and his coauthors observed numerous practical impediments to 
cooperation, including ambiguity in US EPA’s definition of “superior 
environmental performance” (a requirement for US EPA to grant regulatory 
flexibility, the program’s primary benefit), differences in parties’ goals, and 
technical, economic, and legal uncertainties.62 Facing complaints from 
participating businesses over the amount of time required to negotiate 
agreements—on average more than 20 months—as well as concerns from 
environmental advocacy organizations about the potential for environmental laxity 
by companies granted flexibility under the program, US EPA stopped accepting 
new Project XL proposals in 2003.63    Results of US EPA’s Common Sense 
Initiative (CSI) show that it too fell far short of its ambitious goals, due in large 
measure to the requirement that parties reach agreement through consensus.64 And 
participants in the US Department of Energy’s (DOE) Voluntary Greenhouse Gas 
Registry have been said to have engaged in “highly selective reporting,” increasing 
emissions while reporting reductions.65 Failure by US DOE to engage in more 
careful monitoring of participants’ performance apparently allowed members to 
shirk program responsibilities. 
                                                     
57 Johnson (2006) 182. 
58 Morgenstern and others (2007) 135. 
59 Abt Associates (2007) 24. 
60 Delmas and Montes-Sancho (2007); Welch and others (2000). 
61 OECD (2003). 
62 Marcus and others (2002). 
63 Klyza and Sousa (2013). 
64 Coglianese and Allen (2005). 
65 Kim and Lyon (2011) 312. 
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The US EPA’s own analysis of its suite of voluntary programs presents a 
mixed picture. US EPA’s Office of Inspector General reviewed the agency’s 
partnership programs numerous times during the years 2005-2008.66 In a report 
issued in 2006, the Inspector General optimistically indicated that partnership 
programs such as Performance Track, Climate Leaders, WasteWise, and Energy 
Star had the potential to expand the agency’s environmental influence by reaching 
participants who do not typically interact with US EPA and by addressing 
environmental problems not governed by regulations. But later that same year, the 
Inspector General’s analysis of US EPA’s “flagship” voluntary program, 
Performance Track, found that some participants in the “leadership” program 
actually exceeded the sector average for both regulatory violations and toxic 
releases, and that many Performance Track participants did not meet the 
commitments they made to US EPA under the program.67 A subsequent review of 
voluntary programs targeting greenhouse gases in 2008 found that, despite 
recruitment efforts, too few firms were choosing to join these programs to achieve 
meaningful emissions reductions.68  
Voluntary programs aimed at improving the environmental performance of 
products have received less attention by social scientists. The US EPA’s Inspector 
General reviewed the Energy Star program annually in the years 2007 through 
2010, finding that US EPA and US DOE had failed during that period to set clear 
qualifying standards for products bearing the Energy Star label and had relied on 
manufacturers to self-certify that products met government criteria.69 A 2010 report 
by the US Governmental Accountability Office on Energy Star raised similar 
concerns.70 US EPA and US DOE have subsequently tightened Energy Star 
certification procedures. Clearly additional research is both possible and needed on 
this program as with others. 
 
Experience in developing countries 
 
In developing countries, governments often lack the funding, know-how, 
and even political will to develop and implement meaningful, mandatory 
environmental regulations.71 Many firms are small, unlicensed, and difficult to 
monitor.72 A growing number of researchers are exploring the potential for 
voluntary programs to fill gaps in government and private sector capacities in these 
countries.  
Research suggests that firms in developing countries join voluntary 
programs to reduce the cost of regulatory compliance and appeal to customers and 
                                                     
66 US EPA Office of Inspector General (2005); (2006); (2007a); (2008a). 
67 US EPA Office of Inspector General (2007a) 18-19. 
68 US EPA Office of Inspector General (2008a) 5-7. 
69 US EPA Office of Inspector General (2007b); (2008b); (2009); (2010). 
70 US GAO (2010) 
71 McAllister and others (2010) 2.  
72 Blackman (2010) 1. 
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interest groups—the same motivations for firms in developed countries.73 These 
drivers are weaker in developing countries, though, where regulatory agencies lack 
the resources they need to exert significant pressure, and where market pressures 
for “green” practices and products remain relatively limited.74  
In developed economies, voluntary programs serve mostly to encourage 
firms to improve their environmental performance beyond what regulations require. 
However, studies in Mexico75 and Colombia76 find little support that voluntary 
programs lead to environmental performance improvement in the developing 
world. For example, although Mexican regulators chose a public voluntary program 
to address pollution from the Mexican tanning industry because of gaps in 
regulatory, public, and civic infrastructure that rendered mandatory regulations 
futile, those same gaps undermined the effectiveness of the voluntary program.77  
Instead of seeking to induce beyond-compliance improvements in 
environmental performance, developing countries have sometimes pursued 
voluntary programs simply to reduce noncompliance with mandatory rules.78 
Mexico’s Clean Industry Program exemplifies this approach. In order to participate, 
firms must hire third-party auditors to identify areas of non-compliance with 
environmental regulations and work with government to develop a plan to achieve 
compliance. Upon completion of the plan, the government awards participating 
facilities with “clean industry certificates” that entitle members to inspection 
amnesty for two years.79 The program tended to attract larger, dirtier plants that 
were subject to regulatory fines before joining the program. These plants were more 
likely to sell products to overseas markets and government suppliers than non-
members, and may have been subject to greater competitive pressures.80 After the 
two-year amnesty period elapsed, members and non-members were equally likely 
to be subject to regulatory fines, which might be a positive result if the member 
plants were more likely to experience violations in the absence of the program.81  
Chile has negotiated agreements with firms in a variety of sectors as part of 
a national policy to improve regulatory compliance. Researchers attribute the 
success of the program to Chile’s relatively robust environmental regulatory 
program and the fact that the agreements included clear targets and deadlines, 
monitoring by industry trade associations, and sanctions for non-compliance.82 
 
  
                                                     
73 Khanna and Liao (2014) 148. 
74 Blackman (2010) 2. 
75 Blackman and Sisto (2006). 
76 Blackman and others (2009). 
77 Blackman and Sisto (2006) 1041. 
78 Blackman and others (2010) 182. 
79 Ibid 183. 
80 Ibid 191. 
81 Ibid. 
82 Jimenez (2007) 620-621. 
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Impacts of ISO 14001 adoption 
 
Up to now, we have focused solely on voluntary programs adopted and 
implemented by government authorities. Other voluntary programs have been 
established by trade associations and nongovernmental organizations, and the 
lessons from these programs may well be instructive about the potential for 
governments to achieve environmental gains without regulatory mandates. Some 
government programs have even supported or encouraged participation in 
nongovernmental voluntary programs or have been at least partly modeled on them. 
ISO 14001 is perhaps the most well-known and extensively studied private 
voluntary approach to environmental management. Facilities that comply with ISO 
14001’s voluntary standards must establish internal environmental management 
systems (EMSs) through which managers identify the environmental impacts of 
their operations, develop goals to reduce those impacts, check progress toward 
achieving their goals, and take corrective action when progress falls short. To meet 
ISO’s standards, facilities must develop an environmental policy that calls for 
compliance with regulations and continuous improvement. Facilities can become 
certified to ISO 14001 by having a registered third party verify that their 
environmental management system is consistent with the standard.  
Firms that adopt ISO 14001 appear to be motivated by the same factors as 
firms that adopt voluntary programs—they tend to be larger polluters and sell 
products directly to consumers.83 A few studies have found statistically significant 
positive results associated with facility adoption of the kind of environmental 
management systems called for under ISO 14001. Darnall and Kim found that firms 
that adopted EMSs reported levels of environmental performance relatively better 
than non-adopters.84 Another study suggests that facilities that certify to ISO 14001 
may be more likely to monitor the environmental performance of suppliers.85 And 
Prakash and Potoski, in one the most sophisticated investigations to date, found that 
ISO 14001 certification was associated with facilities spending less time out of 
compliance as well as with some decreases in toxic releases.86 Even so, the impacts 
of ISO certification tend to be substantively small. The ISO-certified facilities in 
Prakash and Potoski’s study, for example, were on average out of compliance only 
one week less than other facilities and, as Prakash and Potoski acknowledge, their 
findings on toxic releases were “difficult to interpret” and reflected “not a very large 
improvement.”87 
 
Conclusion 
 
Governments around the world have adopted voluntary environmental 
programs since the mid-1980s. With the passage of time, a number of these 
programs have been studied to understand their effectiveness, which will generally 
                                                     
83 Anton and others (2004). 
84 Darnall and Kim (2012). 
85 Arimura and others (2011). 
86 Potoski and Prakash (2006) 146-170. 
87 Ibid 166; see also Coglianese (2008). 
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be understood to be a function both of the number of firms that choose to join the 
program and the impact of the program on the participants. Both modeling and 
empirical evidence suggests that firms join these programs to reduce the costs of 
complying with regulation, to appeal to customers, and to respond to internal 
organizational factors. The design of these programs also appears to matter; those 
that offer the most benefits also impose the greatest requirements for entry and 
ongoing participation—and tend, perhaps counter-intuitively, to attract the fewest 
participants. Overall, participation in voluntary environmental programs is limited 
to a very small fraction of businesses that contribute to environmental concerns.   
When it comes to discerning effects of voluntary programs on business 
behavior and environmental impacts, a few studies suggest that some programs are 
associated with statistically significant improvements, but overall even these effects 
tend to be very modest. When voluntary programs do seem to work best, it appears 
they do so because they are reinforced by the presence of strong community 
pressures and regulatory threats. Despite the allure of having government motivate 
business without adopting mandates, it appears that not only are voluntary 
programs unlikely to substitute for regulations, but also that whatever minor 
impacts they have depends on the existence of mandates lurking in the background. 
At most, the role for voluntary programs appears to be as a modest supplement to 
government regulation. 
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